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FOREWORD 
This working paper is one of a series* produced by IIASA discussing the practical 
problems of East-West Joint Ventures located in the CMEA countries. 
In this paper the author discusses joint-ventures' salient managerial and personnel 
issues, an often overlooked but increasingly critical aspect in these cooperative ventures. 
Beyond analyzing relevant host-country legislation, the paper delves into actual human 
relations and organizational problems as discussed by joint-venture practitioners: 
managers, partners, rank and file employees, and government representatives. These 
practitioners help explain where likely trouble spots will arise in areas such as hiring, 
wage determination and incentivization, organizational set-up, productivity, and conflict 
resolution. They further explain the influential role of the host-country's general citizenry 
on the joint venture's success or failure. Importantly, the case studies also offer some 
practical solutions to these difficult issues. 
While the economic environment of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe changes 
daily, this analysis of how Eastern and Western management systems and personnel mesh 
in joint ventures is likely to  continue to  be relevant as the two systems move closer 
together. 
Robert H. Pry 
Director 
IIASA 
*To date, the following papers have been published: 
Djarova, Julia Joint Ventures: A New Reality of Eat-West  Cooperation (State-of-theArt), June 1988, 
WP-88-054. 
Benedek, T a m a  Some Experiences of Joint Venture Eetablishment and Operation in Hungary, September 
1988, WP-88-88. 
Ranenko, V., Soloviev, I. Joint Ventures with Foreign Capital Participation in the Soviet Union: Experi- 
ences and Future Outlook, January 1989, WP-8943 
Soloviev, I. Guidelines of Foreign Partner Selection in the USSR, January 1989, WP-8942 
Razvigorova, E. Joint Ventures: A New Practice in Bulgarian Foreign Economic Legislation, March 1989, 
WP-89-026 
Maciejko, R. Joint Ventures in Poland, May 1989, WP-89-36 
Razvigorova, E., Djarova, J., Leitner, W. A New Step Forward for Ea t -Wes t  Joint Ventures, June 1989, 
WP-89440 
BetvSf, 0. Quo Vadis Ea t -Wes t  Joint Venture? Reflections on Selected Aspects of the Development of 
Eat-West  Joint Ventures, June 1989, WP-89-042 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Eastern European regimes crumble and the traditional central role of the state 
diminishes, East-West joint ventures are riding the slippery economic crest of change, a 
balancing act that requires perseverance, creative problem-solving, and a surprising 
amount of interpersonal skill and management. As is only recently being noted, East- 
West joint ventures are unpopular with many local citizens and public officials, who 
either view such partnerships as perpetrators of destabilizing unwanted change or as the 
source of growing jealousy between those who are and those who are not employed by 
them. This acceptance problem is further exacerbated by an Eastern workforce that often 
lacks the experience in independent initiative and decision-making needed to  make the 
venture work. Such an environment can breed enough internal bickering and external 
strife to  ruin any partnership. "Signing the papers that establish joint ventures is easy," 
says Michael Levit, a partner in the US-Soviet joint venture Symbol, "getting people to  
work together is much more difficult." 
The tensions created by this lack of acceptance and freemarket knowledge show up 
clearly in all levels of East-West joint-ventures' managerial and personnel relations: 
between government officials and the joint-venture management, between Eastern and 
Western managers, between management and workers, and finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, between the joint venture and the general population of the host countries. 
Such tensions can ultimately threaten investments by creating bureaucracy and increasing 
costs, while a t  the same time, decreasing output and product quality. 
This paper uses case studies and extensive interviews to  document and assess some 
of the key human resource and management issues in East-West joint ventures located in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union. It also uses these 
actual operating experiences to  demonstrate some basic solutions to  common, and often 
avoidable, joint-venture tensions. In specific, this paper shows that the intelligent hiring 
of joint-venture managers and rank and file employees, an understanding of the limits and 
uses of material and other incentives, careful workplace organization, and simply an 
awareness of potential personnel and managerial issues can sometimes make the difference 
between profit and loss. 
Beyond warning operators of potential pitfalls, however, joint-venture experience in 
labor and management issues may also destroy some negative myths about operations in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Despite long-held beliefs to  the contrary, the 
Eastern workforce can be highly productive, easily obtainable and extremely affordable. 
Similarly, open-minded Eastern managers with good interpersonal skills and contacts 
often create an open and highly productive work environment. Some joint-venture experi- 
ences have also shown that there can be advantages in dealing with the Eastern govern- 
ments' centralized structure and bureaucracy; "The government moved a subway-line for 
us," exclaimed Flemming Jensen, General Manager of the Hotel Sheraton Balkan in Sofia, 
"...try getting that done in the West." 
Finally, within the context of the fast-evolving and vague Eastern legal systems, 
these case studies show that operators must know more than basic host-country labor 
laws and managerial regulations. This is because joint-venture investors and operators 
may receive two or three different and often conflicting answers from Eastern government 
officials on legal questions of joint venture policy. "Trying to  figure out the business law 
around here is like on-the-job legal training for both the government and for us," said one 
exasperated American executive. Even where guidelines appear steadfast, actual opera- 
tions vary widely. In short, existing joint-venture practice, and not necessarily the writ- 
ten laws, often defines what operators can and can not do. 
Certainly, human resource and managerial issues vary by industry. Perhaps more 
significantly, they differ based on the joint venture's host-country. Joint ventures in 
Prague operate in a different environment than those in Budapest or in Moscow. Where 
significant differences in legal and operating policy exist by country they have been docu- 
mented. Yet, in all cases, East-West joint ventures represent the difficult but fascinating 
integration of the controlled and freemarket systems. Or, as put more succinctly by PC 
WORLD-USSR board member Frank Cuttita, "...combining the two systems is like invit- 
ing tuxedos and leisure suits to the same party." As such, similar policies and problems 
arise and make sharing techniques and experiences valuable. 
11. METHODOLOGY 
The information used in this paper was collected between July 1988 and December 
1989. It was gathered almost exclusively through freeform interviews with some 75 
joint-venture managers, employees, shareholders, government officials, and other experts, 
representing 20 joint ventures located in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and poland' (see the appendix for a listing of the joint ventures involved). 
Because of the sensitivity of their positions, some interviewees would discuss certain 
issues only when granted anonymity. The 20 joint ventures, like the interviewees, were 
chosen to  provide as broad a range of experiences as possible. They include production, 
service and retail joint ventures in fields which vary from tourism and publishing to high- 
technology and heavy manufacturing. 
The case study selection and interview process provided this study with an opera- 
tional focus and a richness of experiences that a more structured methodology could not 
accommodate. Thus, while this paper originally was to focus solely on labor and human 
resource issues, during the research phase the focus was expanded as joint venture opera- 
tors revealed that managerial questions often play a critical role not only in setting 
human resource policy but also in determining the viability of the entire joint venture. 
Because most of the joint-venture operators could not be re-interviewed, this study does 
not try to describe the evolution of these issues over time, but merely documents the 
operational situation as it stood between mid 1988 and late 1989. 
The next section of this paper provides some background on the partners that form 
East-West joint ventures and the top managerial structures they utilize: the Board of 
Shareholders, the Advisory Board and the Management Board. Section IV looks into the 
range of issues affecting the joint venture's top Eastern and Western managers, respec- 
tively. Section V analyzes these issues as they relate to the joint ventures' rank and file 
employees. Section VI offers some conclusions. 
Because the focus of this paper is on joint-venture management and labor questions, 
the issues surrounding the joint-ventures' partners are investigated only in the context of 
their direct impact on the joint venture's daily management and human resource policy. 
Yet some brief background on the initial roles and tendencies of the Eastern and Western 
partners is helpful to understand the complexities faced by the joint ventures' full-time 
employees. These partners, in conjunction with the Eastern host government officials, not 
only define the purpose, scope and feasibility of the venture, but they also build its 
operating structure and select its management. 
l ~ h e  caae study of Sheraton's Hotel Balkan, while not a joint venture, waa also used. 
A. THE PARTNERS 
Eastern partners in East-West joint ventures are almost exclusively government 
ministries or major factories and other business establishments (enterprises) under the 
supervision of a ministry. In some cases research institutes, banks, foreign trade organiza- 
tions (FTO's), as well as smaller enterprises or cooperatives have received equity for the 
expertise, resources or personnel they bring to the venture. Partnerships that cross enter- 
prise and ministry lines can pool resources and speed approvals in even the most highly 
segmented, planned economies like the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In a few 
instances, Eastern governments have also given some of their citizens with close relation- 
ships to Western businessmen a free hand to establish and operate joint-ventures around 
those relationships; in return, however, the ministries and factories that formerly 
employed these citizens usually receive some ownership stake in the joint venture. 
On the Western side, partners range from large multi-national corporations to  indi- 
vidual entrepreneurs. Western partners of East-West joint ventures are almost 
exclusively for-profit institutions. Unlike their Eastern counterparts, partners from free- 
market countries generally have not teamed up with other Westerners when establishing 
joint ventures. This may be changing, though, as groups of corporations like the Ameri- 
can Consortium have recently come together to pool complimentary resources and con- 
tacts. 2 
The factors which brought the 20 Eastern and Western partners in this study 
together were as varied as the businesses ultimately undertaken. Some major companies 
like Siemens and Honeywell had extensive previous experience with their Eastern 
partners; for them the joint venture was simply an extension of that historical involve- 
ment and an attempt to secure and expand their market shares in the East. In other 
instances, Western partners with specific business propositions but no prior experience in 
the East were directed by host-country government officials or trade organizations to the 
proper Eastern ministry and officials. In a few cases Eastern ministries or enterprises ini- 
tiated the contact either by directly soliciting a specific Western company or through a 
Request for Proposal or "tender" process as it is known in the ~ a s t . ~  Finally, some of the 
most successful joint ventures have evolved simply from chance meetings between like 
minded Eastern managers and Western businessmen at trade fairs or other similar events. 
Despite beliefs to the contrary, prior working experience with one's joint-venture 
partner doesn't always help ease internal problems once operation gets underway. Cer- 
tainly, an understanding of the host-country's operating environment and trust at  both 
the partnership and managerial level is important. Nevertheless, as explained throughout 
this paper, both sides find that joint ventures create greater internal tensions than previ- 
ous trade relations, especially in the management and personnel realm. Thus, and often 
to their surprise, experienced partners seem to have as much trouble working together as 
newly organized relationships. This may be because those Western partners with prior 
host country experience often are large organizations that attempt to establish equally 
large and complicated joint ventures which can be very difficult to govern. 
2 ~ h e  Consortium is a cooperative agreement formed in early 1989 by six major US corporations to develop 
US-Soviet joint ventures. It was established largely to use the Chevron Corporation's hard currency earning 
ability to circumvent the other companies' difficulties arising from the Soviet ruble's non-convertibility. 
3 ~ o r  further information on the Tender process see Soloviev, I., 'Guidelines of Foreign Partner Selection in 
the USSR.' U S A  working paper WP-89-02, January 1989. 
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Recent changes in host countries' joint venture laws have all but eliminated previous 
socialist government regulations over these superstructures. Governmental requirements 
regarding the size, or nationality and professional origin of the board members have been 
abolished. In all five countries analyzed, foreigners are now allowed to chair any of the 
three boards and may also serve as the joint-venture's General Director overseeing daily 
operations. Despite the legal changes, all the General Directors in this study were 
Eastern citizens. Western managers, when they existed, normally served as a Deputy 
General Director or in other top managerial positions. Notably, in order to  counterbal- 
ance the potential for greater Western control brought on by the deregulation, the 
December 1988 Soviet Foreign Lnvestment Decree stipulates that major decisions made by 
the Board of Directors now must be unanimous. However, what is considered a "major 
decision" is left up to  the joint ~ e n t u r e . ~  
When the negotiating concludes and all agreements have been signed, the joint 
venture's Management Board and other full-time employees often are left on their own to 
make the joint venture work. Yet, by most accounts (including, ironically, those of share- 
holders on both sides), negotiating partners consistently underestimate both the philo- 
sophical and logistical difficulties that East-West joint ventures will encounter in trying 
to  mesh two very different economic systems. In the words of one Western Deputy Gen- 
eral Director: "They set it up, and then they forget about it." The following is a look 
into what happens to  the joint-venture's management and other full-time personnel after 
the partners have walked away. 
IV. EASTERN MANAGEMENT 
According to  Dr. Franz Silbermayr, a member of the Board of Directors of the 
Austrian-Soviet joint venture Petrovoith, "Eastern managerial development, more than 
repatriation, capital or other questions, is the most critical issue facing East-West joint 
ventures today." Silbermayr is not alone in his belief. By most accounts the top Eastern 
managers, and specifically the General Director, are the joint venture's most important 
employees. Because of the host-countries' difficult business environments and traditions, 
internal managerial requirements, and the unfamiliarity of Western partners in operating 
in this new environment, top Eastern managers often control both the joint venture's 
external and internal relations. When these Eastern managers actively and independently 
work to  promote the profit-making goals of the joint venture, success often follows. When 
they instead are too closely tied to  the Eastern partner, or are too steeped in the tradi- 
tions of the centralized economies, difficulties arise. 
A. ROLES AND IMPORTANCE 
The roles and importance of the Eastern Managers hinge on a number of factors. 
First, the Eastern host-countries clearly lack the service, legal and personnel infrastruc- 
tures that many Western businessmen have come to rely on. Standard services from 
employment agencies to  car rental companies are usually impossible to  come by. Add to 
this the still strong control of the centralized planned economic systems, and it  is easy to  
understand why H. Michael Mears, the US Commercial Counselor in Moscow, warns 
Westerners planning to  work in these areas to be prepared to enter "not just another 
country, but another planet." Within these conditions Eastern managers are often heavily 
 he Bulgarian Foreign Investment Decree #56 atipulatea that joint venture founding documents muat ex- 
plain the Board of Directors' deciaion-making proceaa. 
relied on to  use their contacts and experience to guide the joint venture through the exter- 
nal problems faced by the joint venture, be they supply bottlenecks, pricing problems, or 
superfluous government regulations. Comments Igor Faminsky, Director of the USSR's 
All Union Institute for Foreign Economic Affairs, (despite Western wishes to the con- 
trary) "...it would be hard to  imagine a foreigner playing the leading role as a General 
Director because few foreigners are familiar enough with the inner structure of the econ- 
omy and the interaction between (Eastern) enterprises and ministries." 
Eastern managers also often dictate the joint venture's internal operations. This has 
much to  do both with the roles assigned by the partners and the joint venture's location 
in the East. With the overwhelming number of joint ventures' employees coming from 
the host-country, Eastern managers normally are asked to  oversee personnel policy and, 
as explained in the following sections, to  hire, fire and oversee day-to-day administration. 
In contrast, Western managers are normally responsible for technical oversight, export 
marketing and quality control. In some cases there are no full-time Western managers 
even employed by the joint venture. Certainly, exceptions to  this structure exist, but for 
most joint ventures analyzed "...the Eastern General Director," explained one Western 
manager, "sets the tone ... and everybody knows that he's the boss." 
B. PERFORMANCE 
According to  Western partners and managers, the performance of these joint venture 
"bosses" has been mixed, with some getting high reviews and others vilified. About one in 
three Western joint venture representatives interviewed had serious problems with their 
top Eastern managers; in four cases the Western shareholders were working to  replace the 
General Director or had already done so.' Complaints generally centered around the 
managers' lack of understanding of the free-market system and their dependence on 
hierarchic, bureaucratic structures. Whispered one Western Deputy General Director, 
"They're very autocratic around here. They don't like subordinates making decisions." 
This tendency may further explain the Eastern managers' controlling role in the joint 
venture. It may also explain why some Eastern managers are afraid t o  make decisions 
without the blessing of their superiors. Said one Western shareholder regarding a Polish 
General Director who has since been removed; "Every time he had to  make a decision 
he'd pick up the phone and pass it by the ministry first." 
This Eastern management dependence is based not only on a lack of experience in 
risk-taking and decision-making but also on an insecurity regarding the viability of new 
joint ventures. According to  co-workers, some Eastern managers simply did not buy into 
the goals of the joint venture. Instead, they linked their personal fortunes to  the stability 
of the Eastern Partner and the host-enterprise, whom they believed would be around far 
longer than the fledgling joint enterprise. Commenting on her joint venture's internal 
strife, a Soviet joint-venture employee warned that "...the General Director had better 
start realizing that his interests are tied to this joint venture or we're going to  have a 
disaster on our hands." 
But it is not always the Eastern managers who run the ship aground; sometimes the 
joint-venture's partners are also complicitous in managerial difficulties. Either they do 
not allow their respective managers to  operate independently or they fail to  work out 
their differing work-styles and goals during joint venture negotiations. Often Western 
partners sought production and distribution primarily to  expand into the internal Eastern 
markets, while the Eastern partners wanted to  produce for third markets and 
we his frequency of Eastern management turnover was similar to that in Soviet joint ventures as a whole. 
According to Lev Weinberg, President of the Soviet Union's Joint Venture Club, 6 of the firet 30 Soviet 
joint venture General Directore were replaced within the firet eighteen months. Of course reasons beyond 
Western shareholder dissatisfaction may have caused this turnover. 
immediately increase their hard currency receipts. Similar tensions arose over questions 
involving technology transfer. Western partners often sought to  start the joint venture 
using less complicated cooperation methods such as assembly and service, while Eastern 
partners wanted more sophisticated technological production introduced sooner. 
Interestingly, the most harmonious joint ventures often manifested a strong working 
relationship not only among managers but also specifically between the Western partners 
and the top Eastern manager. These relationships helped to set a precedent for balance 
and cooperation throughout the entire joint venture. In referring to  the particularly suc- 
cessful US-Soviet joint venture Dialog, Michael Mears of the US Commerce Department 
explained that "...there is no question that the relationship between Joe Ritchie (the 
American partner) and Pyotr Zrelov (the Soviet manager) is the key to  that joint 
venture's success." 
Dialog, and other similarly successful joint ventures, often have another thing in 
common: independent Eastern managers with excellent managerial skills. From Poland 
to  Hungary, such independence was made possible by partners on both sides that were not 
afraid to give their managers full operational decision-making power, in some cases mak- 
ing them partners as well. As for the special talents and qualities that partners might 
look for in top Eastern managers, they are varied and by most accounts, not always easy 
to find. 
First, as explained, a quality Eastern manager must understand the workings and 
pitfalls of the changing socialist structure. He must also believe in the profit-making 
goals of the joint venture and be willing to  work toward those goals. Futhermore, this 
manager should be, according to  both Eastern and Western sources, an "entrepreneur" 
unafraid to  take the risks required to  navigate the joint venture through the difficult con- 
ditions of the Eastern market. Some experience in working in a free-market country usu- 
ally helps here too. Does this mean that the manager must think and act "Western?" 
"No," says Zrelov of Dialog, "it is not Western thinking, it is simply logical thinking." 
Others would disagree. 
By any name, the operating style of the Eastern managers can have a significant 
impact on the bottom line of the joint venture. Is he hiring active, energetic employees, 
or disinterested cast-offs from ministries under siege? Is he, as one Western joint venture 
manager explains, "...creating a family atmosphere of cooperation," or re-creating an 
Eastern bureaucracy where employees are afraid to  make decisions and voice complaints? 
Perhaps most importantly, is he pushing the limits of the existing system knowing which 
regulations are steadfast and which ones are malleable in order to  get the most for the 
joint venture, or does he simply say "it's not allowed." 
C. HIRING 
In all Eastern countries surveyed, both types of Eastern managers, the "traditional" 
and the "entrepreneurial," existed. Few of the managers surveyed, however, could be con- 
sidered to  be in between these two management styles. They either displayed an 
entrepreneurial "common sense" and energy, or they did not. Yet despite these large 
differences, and the leading role played by the top Eastern Managers, in two thirds of the 
cases analyzed Western shareholders had little input into the Eastern management's 
selection and in some cases had not even interviewed them prior to their hiring. "The 
ministry simply told us one day that they had chosen the General Director and the 
(Eastern) Deputy General Director," said one Western shareholder of a US-Soviet joint 
venture. When asked about this lack of involvement, shareholders often explained that 
during the normally tense negotiating period other issues seemed more pressing. Instead, 
most of the Western partners generally trusted the candidates put forth by their Eastern 
counterparts and anticipated working out any potential problems through the Board of 
Directors. 
With few exceptions, the top Eastern managers are brought into the joint venture 
directly from key positions in the major host-country partner's ministry or enterprise. As 
former Financial and Deputy Directors within an enterprise or Department Directors 
within the ministries, most of these joint-venture General Directors and Eastern Deputy 
General Directors have held positions of reasonably high status and responsibility and 
often have worked closely with the Eastern members of the joint venture's Board of 
Shareholders. On rare occasions the joint venture placed public advertisements for top 
management positions. More frequently, top managers were part of the team that helped 
to  initiate the joint venture and were handpicked by the Eastern partners. 
D. WAGES 
While Westerners often complain about the lack of available Eastern managerial 
talent, they can no longer point to  explicit host-government wage limits as the cause. 
Joint ventures now are almost completely unregulated in this respect. One notable excep 
tion are host-government mandates that no hard currency be paid to  Eastern citizens 
6 (except for per diem payments when traveling abroad). In explaining the regulation, one 
Polish official said; "If we allow joint ventures to  pay our people in "valuta" (foreign 
currency), then "valuta" becomes the legitimate currency in our country."' 
Wages for the General Director and other Eastern managers usually are established 
by the major Eastern shareholder despite the fact that most founding documents assign 
the task to  the full Board of Directors. All the Western partners interviewed, however, 
felt that Eastern management compensation, usually a t  20-40% above comparable 
managerial levels, was extremely reasonable. For example, a Soviet General Director's 
base salary of 750 rubles per month (approximately two and a half to  three times the 
average Soviet wage) translates to  about $1200 US, with a Deputy General Director 
receiving about 100 rubles less per month. 
Not surprisingly, these salaries create jealousies between the Eastern joint venture 
managers and toplevel Eastern bureaucrats. Few enterprise directors or deputy ministers 
can understand why their former subordinates should now earn more than they are paid. 
These former bosses may also object to  losing a key employee, often without compensa- 
tion, and may be bitter that they themselves have not been chosen for the joint venture. 
"For managers moving from a major enterprise or ministry into a joint venture," says 
Michael Volodarsky, a Soviet advisor to  the PC World-USSR joint venture, "it is like 
going from the public to  the private sector in the United States. Although you may have 
fewer people reporting to  you in the joint venture, you are paid more, you have much 
more responsibility for the bottom line of the enterprise, and you usually have higher 
status." 
In these cases where tensions arose, the top Eastern partner will normally intervene 
on behalf of the embattled joint venture managers in an effort to insure the cooperation of 
enterprise and ministry leaders. In a few instances, however, the Eastern partners offered 
no such help. Instead the partners' relationships with the Eastern managers (with whom, 
in these instances, they had not worked previously) were acrimonious. A few explana- 
tions might be given for why these tensions exist: First, as the joint venture required 
Eastern managers to  answer to  both Eastern and Western partners, the Eastern partners 
became unhappy about losing some control over Eastern managers. The partners may 
also be responding to  managers whom they found to be too entrepreneurial and 
'~ulgarian Decree #56 is alone in allowing hard currency payments to Eastern citizens working in joint ven- 
tures. To date, Czechoslovakia has controlled all joint venture wages; Hungary imposes wage controls only 
on ventures with lean than 20% foreign ownership and with a capitalization of less than 5 million forints. 
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independent. Second, according to some sources, these partners were also unhappy that 
they were not as involved with the daily joint-venture operations as they would like to  
have been. And finally, some partners appeared to  be having difficulty balancing their 
roles as head of two distinctly different and in some ways competitive entities. Ironically, 
in the few instances when problems between the Eastern partner and Eastern manager 
have arisen, the managers readily admit that they have become more closely allied with 
the Western partners. As one explained; "(the Western partner) and I are close. Without 
him around I probably would have been replaced long ago." 
V. WESTERN MANAGEMENT 
In many ways, looking into the human resource and managerial issues related to  
Western joint venture employees is more difficult than doing so for their Eastern counter- 
parts. In part this is because there simply are not as many Western managers as Eastern, 
and partly because of the lesser roles that they often assume. What is clear is that host- 
country rules, regulations and difficult working conditions have a large and often negative 
impact on these Western joint-venture employees. Such hindrances increase costs and in- 
turn limit Western participation, sometimes even precluding full-time Western involve- 
men t . 
A. ROLES 
As the key representative of capitalist partners in the unsettled business environ- 
ment of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Western managers often have an extremely 
difficult role to  play. They are directly responsible for the successful transfer of complex 
technology or services into an unprepared and resource-scarce setting, they must work 
closely with Eastern managers and employees (many of whom have had little training or 
experience in Western business ventures) and they must intuitively understand what is 
allowed and not allowed in a setting where rules are both fluid and vague. 
Due to the relative high cost of employing and providing an infrastructure for 
Westerners in planned economies, Western employees are almost always in top 
managerial and technical positions. The roles of the Western Deputy General Director 
and other Western employees may be formally stated in the joint-venture's foundation 
documents or informally established over time. In most cases Western employees are 
asked to  serve multiple functions within the joint venture. Beyond working with the 
Eastern General Director on basic administrative oversight, standard roles for Western 
managers and engineers include training, technical supervision, and quality control of the 
joint venture's goods or services. Western employees will also oversee home and third- 
country marketing and sales if the joint venture is exporting from the host-country. 
B. WAGES 
Adequately reimbursing Western employees can be both enormously expensive and, 
within some Eastern countries, highly regulated. Only a few Eastern European and 
Soviet cities have the infrastructure and services including apartments, automobiles, and 
schools that Western Managers and their families desire. Thus, both to  entice competent 
and high-level workers, as well as to pay for the accommodations their managers desire, 
Western companies incur high costs. One partner cited an outlay of approximately 
$400,000 per year to employ a manager that would cost one-quarter to  one-third of that 
in his home country.8 Sometimes these high salary levels have resulted in an imbalance 
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between the joint-venture manager's payments and those of other managers in the home- 
company. As one executive explained, "Compensation is so high that it is difficult for 
companies t o  fit the person back in the corporate hierarchy once they have finished their 
assignment ."g 
The affordability problem often is exacerbated by the fact that the major portion of 
Western staffs' salaries is borne by the Western partner alone - not the entire joint ven- 
ture. Although all full-time Western employees received a local-currency (and sometimes 
a hard-currency) salary directly from the joint venture, in twelve out of thirteen cases 
these salaries had to  be supplemented by hard currency payments directly from the 
Western partner. These payments, which are often accrued and repaid to  the Western 
partner when the joint venture earns hard currency profits, have become a sensitive issue 
for a few joint ventures whose earnings have not matched their projections. 
Those joint ventures that do not want to  supplement Western salaries, or have trou- 
ble doing so because of host-country regulations, may simply forgo hiring Western 
employees entirely. Of the 20 joint ventures analyzed for this study, seven had no full- 
time Western staff. The absence of Westerners varied according to  the host-country 
analyzed. Most of the Soviet Union and Hungarian-based joint ventures in this study had 
at  least one full-time Western staff member, while few of the Polish, Bulgarian and 
Czechoslovakian joint ventures employed Westerners. In the latter countries, hiring has 
been limited due to  laws or policies which require that hard currency salary payments 
come out of the joint venture's hard currency earnings, and currency exchange constraints 
which make repatriation and, thus, savings of the hard currency almost impossible for 
Western employees. 
Not all joint ventures have suffered without full-time Western managers. The 
Austrian-Soviet joint venture Sporthotel Gudauri, which is developing a ski resort in 
Soviet Georgia, used experienced Hungarian managers t o  replace their more expensive 
Austrian employees. Other joint ventures avoided regulations and lowered costs by hiring 
Westerners either on a contract basis or by using Western partners and employees as con- 
sultants to  oversee the joint venture's start-up and training and, later, t o  monitor pro- 
gress with planned monthly visits. In such cases the Western partner usually assumes the 
hard currency portion of the employees' expenses, with the host-country partner or the 
joint venture paying for all local currency costs. Yet unless the joint enterprise is fairly 
simple or there is unusual trust between the Western partners and the Eastern managers, 
such arrangements generally require too much Western shareholder involvement in daily 
operations to  be desired by either party. 
Beyond a few complaints from Czech officials, the disparity between Eastern and 
Western management wage levels caused few tensions within the joint venture. This may 
be due to  the fact that Eastern joint venture employees are among the highest paid in 
their countries. It also may be a result of East-bloc tradition in which Westerners, and 
some highly privileged Eastern citizens, have been accorded "more equal" treatment. 
"Socialist country citizens," explained one Western Deputy General Director, "are used 
to  having foreigners treated differently. Foreigners get off airplanes first, wait in fewer 
lines and are able to  buy certain goods (with hard currency) that natives can only look 
at." He stated that Eastern employees are extremely reluctant to  'rock the boat' even if 
they have been mistreated. This trend may be changing, however, in light of the East's 
recent political and labor upheavals. 
To insure that their accrued benefits and seniority within the home country are 
retained, Western joint-venture managers normally continue their existing employment 
contracts with the Western partner. The partner then contracts with the joint venture 
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for the employee's services. Occasionally the Western employee signs dual contracts with 
the joint venture and with the Western partner. Explicit Eastern government approvals 
for full time Western employees are no longer required (except in Poland). Still, joint ven- 
tures find i t  good practice t o  clear incoming Western employees through their major 
Eastern shareholders. Most originating joint venture documents include the number and 
names of their Western employees as well. 
In rare instances, Western employees have been asked to  join host-country labor 
unions. Those interviewed declined since their pension, health and vacation benefits dic- 
tated and provided by their Western employer, were usually quite sufficient. Nevertheless, 
in the countries analyzed the joint venture is required t o  make standard payments into its 
"social development" fund for pensions and health insurance for all employees.10 With the 
exception of consultants, Western joint-venture employees must pay standard income 
taxes in the host-countries. Some Western shareholders have decided t o  reimburse their 
employees for taxes paid t o  host-country governments since there are few tax treaties 
between these countries and their freemarket counterparts. 
C. HIRINGILIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
Perhaps because they were able t o  bring in long-time, well-established employees for 
placement in major Eastern European and Soviet cities, most joint ventures in this sam- 
ple did not express difficulty in finding competent Western managers. Yet by many 
accounts, such hiring is not always easy. Recently an executive search firm found twelve 
suitable candidates for a top management job in a US-Soviet joint venture on the Black 
Sea, only t o  have all twelve decline the job because their spouses refused t o  relocate.'' 
Younger employees may be more willing to  relocate t o  join joint ventures, but often com- 
panies seek managers with further developed skills. While increasing "Westernization" 
and interest in East Europe could help, the problem could remain as joint ventures are 
now spreading t o  more remote, and less desirable, Eastern European and Soviet cities. 
A large part of this lack of desirability is that  daily life still is not easy for Western 
joint venture employees in a region where Westerners have not always been welcome or 
prevalent. This problem is especially acute in the Soviet Union and until recently in Hun- 
gary where some joint ventures have been forced t o  rely on government agencies such as 
the Soviets' UPDK (Upravlenyin Po  Obsluschivonyiu Diplomatitsheskovo Korpusa) and 
the Hungarian PKI (Penz Intezi Kozpont), which procure consumer and business services 
for foreigners a t  hard currency costs which approach those in major Western cities. 
T o  avoid these costs some joint ventures have begun t o  contract with newly-formed 
cooperatives for services that  range from translating t o  chauffeuring. Western employees 
who rely on the Eastern partner's preexisting service infrastructure and contacts t o  assist 
their search, however, often come up either empty-handed or unhappy with results. Said 
the wife of one Western manager surveying her newly acquired Moscow apartment; "This 
may be luxurious by their standards - but definitely not by ours." And because consumer 
items in the East are far scarcer than the currency used t o  buy them, Western managers 
may also find that  their Eastern cemanagers are not as understanding about such 
differences in living standards as they are about salary differentials. 
Western managers also complain that  resource scarcity and extensive regulation 
hamper the daily management of joint ventures. These problems are again most p r e  
valent in the Soviet Union, where obtaining visas for international travel and reentry,  
and gaining government clearances for domestic travel often must be planned well in 
l0~ungary requires these payment8 only if the employee uses the system. In the Soviet Union payments 
made for Western employees may be reimbursed when the employee leaves the country. 
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advance. Basic office supplies imported from the West, such as telefax and copy 
machines, may take months t o  clear customs. Despite recent legal revisions, some joint 
ventures still are forced to  use hard currency to  pay for items such as domestic air travel 
and visits from the Western partner's representatives. 
As has often been noted, one of the biggest managerial difficulties is the lack of office 
space. One Western manager is contemplating leaving the joint venture simply because 
he is too frustrated with trying to  manage it out of his Moscow hotel room. Combustion 
Engineering's AES-Pris joint venture with the Soviet Petrochemical Refining Ministry has 
some 5Bodd employees spread over three locations, one of which is a highly security- 
conscious federal office building. Andy Pechkovsky, the joint venture's Western deputy 
general director noted that it may take him half a day simply to  get clearance to  see his 
employees; "A problem," he lamented, "which makes hande-on management somewhat 
difficult." Nevertheless, Pechkovsky seems to understand the constraints of doing busi- 
ness in a planned economic environment. "Would we ever let Soviet citizens into the Pen- 
tagon or some of our other government centers without proper clearance?" he asked rhe- 
torically. 
Those Western partners that have had a representative office with foreign creden- 
tials, apartments and other resources that predate the establishment of the joint venture 
have a valuable head-start against their competitors. In addition to  better contacts, these 
well established Westerners also have a base of knowledgeable and trusted employees, 
both local and from abroad, on which they can build their joint-venture's business. Share- 
holders on both sides must be aware, however, of the tensions that are likely to  arise in 
the few cases when a joint-venture manager continues to work on non joint-venture busi- 
ness in the region. 
VI. MIDDLE AND LOWER LEVEL EASTERN EMPLOYEES 
While the workers of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have a reputation for 
being unproductive and difficult to  motivate, many joint ventures have been pleasantly 
surprised. Within certain fields, Eastern joint venture employees, if thoughtfully hired, 
can perform excellent work at  comparatively low wages. Joint ventures' special status 
and ability t o  pay higher wages makes hiring and motivating workers far easier than for 
standard Eastern European and Soviet enterprises. Yet, as with many issues of joint- 
venture operation, this special status can be a double-edged sword also leading to  tensions 
with host-country partners, government officials and fellow workers. With Eastern rank 
and file employees constituting by far the largest share of most joint-venture payrolls, 
managers and shareholders must be aware of these impediments in order to  take advan- 
tage of the opportunities. 
A. HIRING 
By most accounts, the hiring of the Eastern workforce is one of the most critical 
roles of the joint-venture's managers. It may also be one of their most sensitive. 
Although finding employees willing to  join these new enterprises is often far easier than 
locating other joint venture "inputs," the source of these workers must be carefully 
attended to. Handpicking employees from various sources almost inevitably incurs the 
jealousy of former employers. Hiring instead directly from the Eastern partner on a large 
or small scale, while often speeding start-up and increasing contracting-out flexibility, 
may create its own tensions with the non-hired employees and even with the Eastern 
partner. 
Part  of the initial tension accompanying joint-venture hiring is based in traditional 
socialist theory which has sought t o  protect its citizens from becoming spare parts for 
capitalist gain. "You must realize," explains Michael Mears, "that (Eastern) citizens 
working directly for capitalists is one of the great taboos in these countries." Thus, prior 
to  the joint-venture laws, Western businesses could only hire socialist citizens indirectly 
through contract relationships with organizations like the previously mentioned Soviet 
UPDK and the Hungarian PKI which established most terms of employment. In the era 
of joint ventures, the proscription against a direct link between capitalist owners and 
socialist laborers has evolved into explicit warnings by Eastern governments against joint 
ventures that  exploit, rather than train, the host-country workforce. In part, joint ven- 
tures have served t o  make employment between capitalists and socialists more palatable 
by insuring the mediating influence of the Eastern partner. 
This mediating effect, however, does not appear t o  have moderated Eastern citizens' 
desires t o  attain the benefits that  joint ventures can provide as few of the joint ventures 
analyzed had difficulty in finding job candidates. Echoing many of his colleagues, Stan- 
islav Holenda, Technical Director of the Czech-Dutch joint venture Avex explained that ,  
"I have people constantly coming in off the street." 
At the Huta Kosciusko steel mill in Western Poland, the ITHK joint venture was 
founded in an attempt t o  turnaround an undesirable portion of the mill that  could no 
longer find replacements for its exiting workforce. After increasing salaries, and adding 
minor capital investments, the joint venture is turning a profit within the previously 
unprofitable division. Now, with demand to  work in the joint venture so high, ITHK's 
Eastern partners have forced the joint venture t o  sign an agreement not t o  hire any more 
employees from within the enterprise. Beyond the complaints of fellow Eastern 
employers, some government officials also fear the allure t o  Eastern citizens that  joint 
ventures create. Says Anna Halustyik, an advisor to  the Hungarian government on joint- 
venture law, "I am worried that  because joint ventures can provide better financial and 
professional conditions than our standard enterprises, they will artificially select employ- 
ees and drain away the talent needed for our general economic reform." 
The incentives that  Halustyik refers t o  include training and access t o  high- 
technology products, upgraded work facilities and in some cases, the chance t o  travel and 
earn hard currency through per-diem expense payments. Eastern managers and workers 
also cite the attractiveness of working within a less-hierarchical, freer Western manage- 
ment structure and style that  may be the model for future Eastern enterprises. Finally, 
in attracting the Eastern workforce, one must not underestimate the importance of money 
and joint ventures' ability t o  pay salaries that  other Eastern enterprises normally cannot 
match. Says Karoly Csanadi of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce echoing the feel- 
ings of many joint venture operators: "While employees want experience with new tech- 
nology, new organizations and new freedoms, higher pay is still the best incentive for 
workers t o  join joint ventures." 
The hiring of host-country citizens into joint ventures is, for the most part, the 
exclusive purview of the General Director or the Eastern Deputy General Director, 
although some Western managers and shareholders have been very involved in the pro- 
cess. Most joint-venture employees usually are hired directly through the main partner 
ministry or enterprise or from the informal personal networks of the top management. In 
some cases, public advertisements and concourses (contests where potential employees 
must solve a particular service or engineering problem) are also utilized. There also have 
been some instances where Eastern employees were hired through the contacts and the 
recommendation of Western managers. Such hiring procedure may be considered risky for 
the Eastern applicant, however, in countries that  remain highly security-conscious. 
As explained in the section on employee performance, handpicking employees from 
various sources is often considered the best way t o  insure quality hiring. Yet those that  
do so may run into stiff resistance from ministries and enterprises which stand t o  lose 
their best employees and gain little in return. Says Paul Pflamitzer, partner and former 
Deputy General Director of the Hungarian-Austrian joint venture OTP-Penta Tours; "If 
the home enterprise finds out that one of their employees is out looking for a job, they'll 
kill the person." This resistance is especially prevalent in Czechoslovakia and the USSR 
where there is no real tradition of labor market fluidity and where government protection 
of joint ventures against fearful bureaucrats has been inconsistent. In these cases, joint 
ventures may have to assure potential employees a job or, a t  a minimum, clearance from 
levels above their immediate bosses as a pre-condition for application. As explained by 
Vatslav Krotov, the Soviet General Director of the AES-PRIS joint venture, "Pepfle 
don't budge without instructions from the top, without the right political protection." 
Eastern governments are addressing these problems in different ways. In Bulgaria, 
and recently in the Soviet Union, laws have been passed which allow enterprises that pr* 
vide intermediate inputs (including labor) to share the benefits of joint ventures by receiv- 
ing some hard currency payments. Poland has taken a slightly different tack; there, top 
government officials have led interference through the roadblocks established by lower 
level bureaucrats. According to  one Polish General Director, this direct pressure has suc- 
ceeded; "We used to  be treated like dogs," he says, "now we are like cows in India." 
Respective of the country and the level of government support however, Eastern partners 
and managers still are the first and last lines of defense in freeing joint ventures of bureau- 
cratic and political resistance in hiring. 
Hiring directly from the key shareholder ministry or enterprise, or contracting 
wholesale with shareholders' enterprises, which is standard in large production joint ven- 
tures, normally eases the hiring process and may provide flexibility. This reliance often 
significantly shortens the joint venture's start-up time. Guesswork is minimized as joint 
ventures doing so are aware of applicants' track records before hiring. In the instances 
where they may be dissatisfied with an employee's performance, the joint venture hiring 
directly from their Eastern partners sometimes return those employees t o  their former 
positions. 
A close connection with the Eastern partner may also make for a more flexible hiring 
policy. Honeywell's joint venture Systematics hires most of its employees on a part time, 
contract basis from its Eastern partner, the Bulgarian Chemical Ministry. When demand 
is strong, the joint venture hires more technicians. When demand is weak, the technicians 
return to  their positions within the ministry. The Bulgarian partner benefits from its 
share of the joint-venture's profits and from extra payments, some of which is in hard 
currency, for the loan of the employee. The ministry also gains an upgraded, better- 
trained workforce. Honeywell benefits from a profitable joint venture that always matches 
its payroll with its demand. 
In Hungary, a major challenge for public or private firms alike is to  maintain worker 
productivity and allegiance in an economy where a large percentage of the workforce 
holds second jobs. Instead of working against this tendency, the West German-Hungarian 
joint venture Sicontact has utilized it to  their advantage. Sicontact has ceded its entire 
after-hours service department to  a quasi-private company or "VGMK" (Enterprise Busi- 
ness Work Unit) established and run by its employees. Reiner Schoning, the joint 
venture's German Deputy General Director, is extremely satisfied with the situation. 
Says Schoning, "With this arrangement I don't have to  worry about the quality of 
Sicontact's 24-hour service. I also don't worry about the kind of second job that our 
employees are taking." The McDonalds joint venture in Hungary is also accommodating 
itself to  the "second economy" as some of the joint-venture's administrative staff have 
begun giving private English lessons to  their floor workers during non-business hours. 
- 
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Despite the advantages, some Western representatives have noted that a few words 
of caution should precede a joint venture's hiring a majority of its employees from the 
major shareholding Eastern ministry or enterprise. First, Eastern employees may be less 
likely to  put the independent interests of the joint venture ahead of those of their former 
employers (a tendency which, Eastern representatives point out, affects Western employ- 
ees as well). Second, employees hired from outside of the major partner's fold do not 
always receive the same treatment as their counterparts when it comes to  salaries and 
promotion opportunities. As explained, in some cases these employees have turned in 
confidence to  Western managers and shareholders for support, thereby creating internal 
divisions within the joint venture. Third, hiring a critical mass from an Eastern enter- 
prise increases the chances that the bureaucratic procedures of that enterprise might per- 
vade the joint venture as well. 
Yet the biggest problem in a joint venture's strong connection with a large existing 
enterprise or ministry has as much to  do with the joint venture's organizational layout as 
it does with its hiring policy. Frequently, Eastern shareholders and managers mention 
that jealousy of non-joint venture employees working next t o  or near their better paid col- 
leagues de-motivates enterprise workers and threatens the joint venture's internal peace. 
To allay these tensions, Eastern partners often spread the fruits of the joint venture to  its 
non joint-venture employees in the form of upgraded facilities and other hard-currency 
purchased benefits. Persuasion tactics may also be utilized. At the Kosciusko mill, 
management held a company wide meeting at  which the joint-venture's workers where 
asked to  "testify" that their longer work days and meager benefits were a fair tradeoff for 
their higher salaries. In spite of these, and other peace-keeping efforts, most joint ven- 
tures have ended up simply having to physically separate their employees from the 
enterprise's standard workforce. 
B. WAGES 
While most shareholders agree that Eastern joint-venture employees can be hired a t  
bargain rates, in practice, setting these rates can be extremely tricky. Because equality of 
reward, irrespective of performance, has prevailed throughout Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, public and private pressures against wage differentials and performance 
payments abound. To deal with this, all but a few East-West joint ventures self-regulate 
both the levels and the methods of paying their employees. "Don't think," warns Adriano 
Callegari, Deputy General Director of the US-Soviet Sterch-Honeywell joint venture, 
"that you can walk in and structure salaries and bonuses like we do in the West." 
In the long-term, the consumer power of the 400 million person Eastern European 
and Soviet market is often touted as the chief reason that Western companies brave the 
difficult world of East-West joint ventures. Yet many joint ventures are finding that the 
East's inexpensive labor supply not only helps short-term stability, but also can be a key 
to  future export profitability. "At hourly wages of between $1.30 and $2.00 per hour 
fully-loaded," says economist Jan Vanous, "the Eastern labor market can compete with 
any around. And most are located within only 1500 kilometers from Central Europe." 
Vanous points out that highly skilled engineers and scientists can be hired a t  one-fifth to  
one-tenth of their costs in the West. "And comparative costs should be even less," he 
says, "as real effective exchange rates move downward in these countries."13 
Below are a few examples of how some joint ventures take advantage of these 
beneficial wage and skill levels: 
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Numerous joint ventures are using highly-skilled Eastern engineers to replace 
their more expensive Western counterparts, thereby lowering the costs of pro- 
ducts exported from the West. Systematics, among a number of other joint 
ventures, uses software designed by its Bulgarian employees to  accompany its 
equipment sold around the world. 
Petrovoith, Honeywell and other joint ventures find that by using Eastern, 
instead of Western employees to  service and install their products, they are 
able to  charge their Eastern customers less hard currency, thereby retaining a 
competitive price advantage to expand their market share. Sicontact's Schon- 
ing says that his joint venture is providing "German engineering in Hungarian 
hands." It is also providing it a t  closer to  local Hungarian prices. 
Eastern employees can also help to expand capacity and with it, profitability. 
The Hanna-Barbera production company, which had difficulty hiring Western 
animators a t  any price, uses its 'oint venture in Poland to  bring in "some of the 
best animators in the world."'* Paying by piece, they have been able to  hire 
almost 100 new cartoonists for their North American and European produc- 
tions at  bargain prices. 
While formal governmental regulations on joint-venture wage payments have dimin- 
ished, informal pressures are felt by almost all joint-venture managers. From Budapest to  
Leningrad, joint-venture operators hope to  avoid the public animosity and backlash that 
has befallen many cooperatives and other newly private institutions. Inside the work- 
place, as explained, wage differentials lead to  headaches for both the home enterprise and 
the joint venture. Government pressures to  keep wages in line, while less overt, also 
exist. In Poland this pressure seems to be less intense, but other countries are not so 
open. For example, Bulgaria's Decree #56 ended all formal government involvement in 
setting Eastern joint-venture wages and also allowed hard currency salary payments. 
When asked, however, if any joint ventures have taken advantage of the changes, a joint- 
venture manager nodded toward a government official saying "Are you kidding? In prac- 
tice they still control us." And, as Eastern governments nominally give joint ventures 
increased freedom to pay their employees as they please on the one hand, some have 
started taking back control with the other by implementing highly regressive income tax 
schemes that severely undercut the usefulness of allowable wage hikes. 
In treading this thin line between backlash and acceptance, joint ventures have care- 
fully, and sometimes creatively, structured their employee payments to increase pay- 
checks. These salary schemes, which normally are determined by the shareholders in 
smaller joint ventures and by the management board in the larger joint ventures, can be 
segmented into three major groups. The first, which is made up of the most numerous and 
the highest profile joint ventures, normally set base salaries within approximately 20% of 
comparable levels for regulated enterprises and later add discretionary bonuses and 
profit-sharing where possible. These joint ventures may further disguise bonus payments 
under the terms such as "functional allowance" or "additional expense requirements." 
The second set of joint ventures, which usually are smaller, less visible and not as sensi- 
tive to  outside pressures, sets base salaries a t  20-70% above comparable government stan- 
dards, again adding bonuses and profit-sharing above that. Finally, a small minority of 
joint ventures, mainly in Poland, set piece-rate levels. But usually offer little or no addi- 
tional bonus. Commission payments do not appear to have hit the planned economic 
world as yet. With the payment of higher salaries, joint ventures generally do not pay 
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overtime except to low level factory workers. 
Discretionary bonus payments, normally less visible to  outside parties, often consti- 
tute the major salary differences between joint-venture and standard host-country 
salaries. These payments may be equivalent to three to  four months standard salary pay- 
ments before profit-sharing is considered. To understand this bonus implementation, a 
bit of background on standard host-country bonus procedure is helpful. 
Generally, CMEA country enterprises make payments into a Material Incentive 
Fund for bonuses, which theoretically rises or falls based on an enterprise's " 
profitability."15 Each employee's portion of the fund is then determined by a committee 
made up of managers, labor union and employee representatives. Since most socialist 
enterprise revenues have been predetermined by government however, and since Eastern 
economies have bred a tradition of equal pay regardless of performance, little variation 
exists among different enterprises' bonus pools or among their employees' shares of that 
pool. 
Joint ventures generally use the Material Incentive Fund procedure for bonuses, 
except unlike standard Eastern enterprises they base their overall fund allocation on 
profits instead of government mandates. Normally the Board of Directors determines the 
overall bonus pool and the Management Board sets individual bonuses. According to  
joint-venture managers, the various members of the joint venture's Material Incentive 
Committee then rubberstamp these apportionments. Despite their more market-oriented 
structure, however, joint-venture bonus policies in practice are still a far cry from the 
profitability and performance-based systems that many Western companies utilize. Once 
again, tensions rising from socialist traditions are the cause. 
In the Soviet Union for example, some joint-venture shareholders have complained 
that the government forces them to place most employee compensation within more visi- 
ble base-wage payments by making bonuses non-tax deductible (government officials 
dispute this however). Other joint-venture officials explain that since most Eastern 
employees are used to  receiving a bonus regardless of their enterprise's performance, joint 
ventures are under extreme pressure to  make payments into their Material Incentive 
Funds regardless of profitability. 
Traditions of equality have also made the tracking of, and the compensation for, 
individual employee performance nearly impossible. Says OTP-Penta's Pflamitzer, "I 
can't run a business without determining profit centers, and I can't determine profit 
centers without monitoring and evaluating employee performance. Yet when I tried to set 
up an in-house evaluation system within the joint venture, I almost caused a riot." 
Other Western and Eastern managers recount having asked middle-level colleagues to  dis- 
tribute bonus pools based on employee performance only to  find out later that the fund 
had instead been divided equally or that distributions had been based on seniority. As 
one Western manager explains; "These people have been taught their entire lives that 
they are all equal; how the hell can we now expect to  walk in and get them to believe that 
some are better than others - and that the better ones should be paid for it?" 
1 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, is a trading alliance that includes the five countries 
analyzed in this study as well as Cuba, Romania and Vietnam. 
C. BENEFITS, LABOR UNIONS, PARTY INFLUENCE AND CONTRACTS 
Although higher salaries and bonuses are by consensus the most important motivat- 
ing factor for host-country employees, material fringe benefits are critical and traditional 
compensation in countries where shortages of consumer goods prevail. With the excep 
tion of those in Poland, most joint ventures have found it necessary to match the social 
benefits such as housing, vacation accommodations, and even schooling for employees' 
children, that Eastern employers traditionally have provided. At the joint venture's 
outset these benefits usually are provided through the pre-existing infrastructure of the 
major Eastern partner and their labor unions, although some of larger joint ventures have 
started to build their own benefit network. And recently, using their access to hard 
currency, some joint ventures have begun distributing rarely found items like shampoo 
and coffee to their workers. 
Through their ownership of parts of this infrastructure, and through their distribu- 
tion of the holdings of the joint ventures' "Social Funds" which pay for these benefits, 
labor unions have in some cases assured themselves a role in East-West joint ventures. 
Like standard socialist enterprises, joint ventures in the East are required to make pay- 
ments into these funds and, with the exception of Poland, they are also required to form a 
labor union to help in the distribution. The speed with which joint ventures have obeyed 
these government mandates has varied however. Most joint ventures initially use the 
existing unions of the major host enterprise or ministry. In recent discussions, however, 
Lev Weinberg, General Director of the French-Italian-Soviet joint venture Lnterquadro 
and Chairman of the Soviet Union's Joint-Venture Club, has mentioned that many small 
to medium-sized Soviet joint ventures are now working together to establish a joint- 
venture labor union and to  pool resources to provide a cost-effective common benefit 
structure. 
Yet beyond providing the service infrastructure and serving as administrative organs 
for distribution of the material, sickness and pension benefits, Eastern unions are largely 
seen as formalities with little authority over the joint-venture's economics. This view is 
consistent regardless of whom one speaks with. One Hungarian labor union official com- 
plained that unions were in a state of "complete disaster." Perhaps noting this, some Pol- 
ish joint ventures are now abandoning both unions and the socialist tradition of providing 
many benefits and little salary. "Our people," says Hanna-Barbera Poland's General 
Director Wojciech Trzcinski, "get no free coal, no free vegetables, no rent assistance, no 
nothing ...j ust far better salaries. And we don't have a union." Still, until Eastern 
citizens are able to buy more goods with their salaries, and joint venture regulations are 
relaxed, the Hanna-Barbera model probably will not spread. 
Like most Eastern enterprises, many joint ventures have had an internal Communist 
Party apparatus where employees who are party members can meet and discuss issues of 
their choosing. Nevertheless, the party apparatus appears to have had little direct 
involvement in joint-venture management in the past and should have even less as the 
party loses control over governments throughout Eastern Europe. Few top Eastern 
joint-venture managers interviewed were party members and, in most cases, the party 
had neither a formal nor an informal role in hiring or operations. A notable exception has 
been in Czechoslovakia where the upper management of the country's few joint ventures 
were formally approved by party officials. 
When moving into positions with joint ventures, most Eastern employees are man- 
dated by law to provide their former employers with a t  least two months notice. All joint 
ventures established formal probation periods of two to six months for their new employ- 
ees; yet rarely were workers let go after such periods. In part this is because the joint 
ventures were satisfied with their work. Yet most joint venture managers (outside of a 
few consumer-service joint ventures) also admitted that true probationary periods were 
unrealistic, and that as previously explained, longer employment commitments were 
required for joint ventures to lure the employees that they wanted. 
Once hired, host-country employees normally are party to  two contracts with the 
joint venture. The Individual Contract, establishes the employee's pay scale, seniority 
level and specific duties. The Universal or Collective contract is signed with the share- 
holders on behalf of all the joint-venture employees. The Universal contract is negotiated 
by worker representatives and, where they exist, labor unions. It establishes working 
hours, termination policy, and general medical, meal and vacation benefits. The term 
"negotiated" should be used loosely as national labor law dictates much of its content. 
A few joint-venture operators in the Soviet Union have also quietly mentioned that 
illegal mafia-like organizations or "rackets" have been vying to  fill the influence vacuum 
left by the diminishing role of the party, the state and the unions. These rackets prey on 
cooperatives, some joint ventures, and their employees by demanding "protection" money 
from those that "earn too much." Those that refuse to  pay may have their premises van- 
dalized, their "Western" possessions stolen or destroyed, or worse. According to  the vic- 
tims, Soviet officials offer little relief from these rackets. "When I called the Police and 
identified the racketeers," said one joint-venture operator, "they laughed at  me and told 
me that compared with the unrest in the republics, my problem is too small to  deal with." 
D. PERFORMANCE, EFFICIENCY, BUREAUCRACY 
The accessibility and affordability of Eastern employees to  joint ventures clearly 
means little if these employees are unproductive. Yet many joint ventures, including 
approximately 314 of those surveyed here, have been quite satisfied with their Eastern 
rank and file employees. In part joint ventures have found that good performance and 
productivity is simply dependent on finding the right individuals. But other factors, such 
as in which economic sector the joint venture is active, how the joint venture motivates 
its employees, and whether the joint venture can avoid the internal inefficiency and 
bureaucracy that plague many Eastern enterprises, are also critical in getting the most 
out of the rank and file. 
Despite the workforce's reputation as unmotivated and unproductive, most Eastern 
joint venture employees are, according to many sources, mechanically well-skilled and 
enthusiastic about working with "Western" technologies. Thus, many joint ventures that 
design, assemble, service and install low-tech and medium-tech products like computers, 
office automation systems and automated control systems are extremely happy with their 
employees. "They're better than back home," says Combustion Engineering's Pechkov- 
sky. These joint ventures are taking full advantage of the Eastern economies' strong edu- 
cational focus on engineering and technical management in which, according to  Interqua- 
dro Deputy General Director Mario Germondari "...the price of good minds is being subsi- 
dized by the government." 
Those joint ventures, however, that are dependent not on their employees' technical 
finesse, but rather on their understanding and adaptability to  market and consumer- 
oriented services receive no such benefits. Thus, managers of joint ventures in the tour- 
ism and restaurant field, for example, complain that employees must often be pushed to  
be responsive in environments where the consumer traditionally has had low standing and 
no alternatives beyond the government. "I don't know how many times I have tried to  
teach (the employees) t o  put the ashtrays in front of the customers instead of in front of 
the empty chairs," laments OTP-Penta's Pflamitzer. 
Despite the problems, partners and managers say that with some effort, and the 
correct means, Eastern employees in all sectors can be trained and motivated. First, as 
explained, the example provided by a hardworking and open-thinking Management Board 
can be critical. Some Western managers have mentioned that the remnants of the social- 
ist hierarchies have left middle and lower level employees distrustful of their superiors. 
Thus, when managers role up their sleeves instead of simply giving orders, much progress 
can be made. In this regard, informal meetings and firm-wide social outings have also 
been helpful. In part this effort also hopes to show workers that they are employed by a 
special type of enterprise which can provide them with special opportunities. Explains 
ITHK partner Joachim Sombert: "We have imported a new spirit and approach ... which 
means a work trial period, piece work and performance-related payments. The offices and 
halls were modernized and equipped Western style. All this has naturally motivated the 
work force."16 
As Sombert mentions, the motivational effects of material incentives are also not to 
be denied. Herbert Kapellar, a manager with the Ubau construction company responsible 
for the building of the LIM-Marriot Hotel in Warsaw noted that he could tell which of his 
subcontractors paid their Polish employees higher than state-mandated wages simply by 
looking at the productivity differences. Where employees directly received the piece pay- 
ments that nbau was paying the subcontractor, Polish productivity approximated that of 
the Western workers on site. But when the subcontractor (often state-controlled) held 
Polish wages down, the productivity differences could be as great as four to one. "One 
must remember," mentions Kapellar, "that (these) employees have proven themselves to 
be excellent workers in other countries. The incentives and the employment environment 
must be right, however." 
These "environmental" issues often revolve around the quality and age of the tools 
and machinery with which Eastern employees work, as well as the administrative 
efficiency of their workplace. In terms of the former, most joint ventures, recognizing that 
obsolete or faulty machinery will hinder the productivity of even the most highly 
motivated and trained workers, have brought new technology and machinery as part of 
their initial contribution to the joint venture's start-up capital. Surveying the results of 
new machinery and materials installed into his plant, one Eastern joint venture manager 
mentioned that it was difficult to compare his former workplace to his new one: "It's as if 
before our products were hand-made; now they are machine-made." 
Administrative changes can also have a large impact on this transition, and in the 
East bloc that usually means reducing bureaucracy. At Hanna-Barbera, for example, 
administrative staff now make up ten percent of the employees, whereas for the non-joint 
venture portion of the same factory administrators make up almost 60 per cent of the 
workforce. Many other joint ventures cite similar disparities. "The result," says Hanna- 
Barbera's Trzcinski, "is that work that used to take four months now takes two weeks." 
Of course, critical to motivating Eastern employees and reducing bureaucracy is hir- 
ing employees that are open to the new working conditions that joint ventures pose. 
Says Sheraton's Jensen: "Many of the workers are great, you just have to find them." For 
most joint-venture managers, finding the right employees often means looking once more 
for what many called "entrepreneurs;" employees eager to take on varied roles and work 
harder and longer than the average citizen, thus, enabling the joint venture to hire fewer 
employees. In seeking such workers, joint ventures often limited their applicant pool to 
younger citizens. Says one Russian joint-venture manager: "Age is definitely a factor - 
older citizens are a product of a 70 year-old stagnant system." Georgy Prityko, Chair- 
man of Board of the Sterch-Honeywell joint venture agreed: "We won't hire anyone over 
forty. Otherwise they are just too difficult to train. Joint ventures are, and have to  be, a 
matter of the future." 
Yet even when handpicking employees from a limited applicant pool, finding 
employees capable of thriving under the new conditions is not easy. "A lot of it is just 
plain luck," says Kapeller. Because of this, many joint ventures, especially those in the 
consumer-service sector, have resorted to what they call the "shakedown" process. They 
hire more employees than they need, find the ones that are competent, and then over the 
'Auf Schrott gebaut', Unaere Wirtachaft magazine, the Ditsseldorf Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, November, 1989. 
course of approximately one year reduce the workforce size and increase pay levels. The 
McDonalds joint venture in Budapest, for example, started with 300 full-time and 120 
part-time employees, but hopes eventually to end up with half as many. 
This weeding out process partially benefits from what Leonid Govoryutkin, Deputy 
General Director of the AES-Pris joint venture calls a "natural selection" whereby 
Eastern workers that don't have the flexibility or desire to put in the hours that the new 
enterprises require leave the joint venture of their own volition. In some cases, these 
workers were simply not motivated or adaptable and wanted out of the joint venture as 
soon as they realized that their higher wages would not come easily. Yet other, seemingly 
excellent employees also are part of the shakedown, often leaving after burning out from 
the hectic early-days of the joint venture. Says one employee of a service joint venture 
located in Moscow: "I've been working 12 and 14 hour days for the last three months, and 
I'm still waiting for my bonus. Even if it's huge it can't be worth this work." She has 
since left that joint venture to work with another Western company. 
Certainly, not all joint ventures have been able to control administrative numbers 
like Hanna-Barbera or "shakedown" their workforce through natural attrition. As dis- 
cussed later, some joint venture managers have had to coerce or fire Eastern employees 
that they do not need or approve of, each with varying degrees of success. And, as 
explained, some Eastern managers never intend to  reduce the number of employees but 
instead hope to  recreate former bureaucracies. "They just want big," complained one 
Western joint venture manager. To combat this, some Western companies have had hir- 
ing limits and administrative quotas written into their joint venture's founding docu- 
ments. 
Not surprisingly, some Eastern government officials have also "wanted big," as more 
than a few joint ventures have come under pressure to  hire along the lines of traditional 
socialist enterprises. Heinz Chytil, the Austrian Deputy Director of the Sporthotel 
Gudauri joint venture mentioned that he "had to  fight like crazy" with local officials for 
the right to  expand his employees' workweek from 40 to 50 hours thereby avoiding hiring 
an extra shift. Sheraton's Jensen had similar problems; "The Bulgarian government 
wanted me to  hire one person just to pick up empty bottles in the hotel. At first, no 
other employees were allowed to  do that." Eventually, both Chytil and Jensen got what 
they wanted, but both they and others warn that joint ventures must be willing to  
compromise when seeking flexibility from external and internal pressures. 
E. FIRING 
Except during the start-up phases of the consumer-service joint ventures, there was 
surprisingly little staff turnover in the joint ventures analyzed. In large part this is a 
result of competent hiring, the favorable benefits accorded to  joint venture employees, and 
the afformentioned self-selection process. Yet in the few cases where unsatisfactory joint- 
venture employees have remained, the situation becomes considerably more complicated. 
While all operators said that firing was possible, few had done so, and in no cases were 
there large-scale layoffs. Internal pressures, as well as government guidelines, often hin- 
dered the termination process. Because of this, joint- ventures' abilities to  fire employees 
seem to hinge on the will and determination of management to make the move, and on 
the Eastern Director's ability to  carry out that decision. 
Joint-venture managers mentioned that they receive pressure against firing joint- 
venture staff from all sides; other employees, the public and especially Eastern govern- 
ment officials. While the termination process in Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary seemed 
looser than in the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, with a few exceptions it was viewed as 
a very difficult and touchy subject. "You have to  prove that they stole something," men- 
tioned one Western manager. Because of such tensions, this manager and many of his 
counterparts often use less direct methods than firing to  sever the relationship between 
the joint venture and the employee; "We've learned to  force people out," he explained. A 
Soviet manager using similar methods seemed unfazed by the constraints on outright ter- 
mination; "Coercion," he says, 'can be very effective.' 
Part of the difficulty encountered in firing is that except in Poland and Hungary, 
joint ventures are responsible to  find the terminated employee a new job to his satisfac- 
tion. As mentioned, sometimes the employee can be sent back to  his former employer, 
but this is not always easy, even when that employer is the Eastern partner. And while 
host-countries are only now establishing unemployment insurance systems, most have 
mandated severance pay systems. These regulations, like most which are dictated by gen- 
eral host-country labor law, are in a state of flux due to  the political and economic 
changes in the East and must be closely monitored. 
According to partners and managers, the policy key regarding the firing of Eastern 
joint venture employees is to do so selectively, but with determination. When this is done 
the unions, local councils (in Hungary) and party officials (in Czechoslovakia) that must 
be notified often put up a minimum of resistance. "I haven't fired many," says 
Interquadro's General Director Weinberg, "but when I do it, I do it with the speed of 
light." Weinberg mentioned, however, that confidentiality breaches, and not incom- 
petence, were his major grounds for termination. Often, when the determination to fire 
on the grounds of incompetence is made, the initiative comes from the Western side, espe- 
cially in the consumer-service joint ventures. Regardless of how the policy decision to ter- 
minate an employee is made however, in no cases did Western managers or shareholders 
directly fire Eastern employees. Instead, it was Eastern managers, because of host- 
country sensitivities, who were fully responsible for the firing of the Eastern joint venture 
employees. 
F. TRAINING 
Despite the desire on all sides that East-West joint ventures play a key role in train- 
ing Eastern employees in Western business skills and the ways of the free-market, actual 
results in this area have been mixed. Certainly, joint ventures have helped to transfer 
some modern technical skills to the East as well as to train many Eastern citizens in some 
of the operational facets of modern Western consumer-service businesses. Many joint ven- 
tures, as well, have used host-country government aided training opportunities to improve 
hiring, product quality and profits. Ultimately however, joint ventures may be too is- 
lated within the larger controlled economic systems to be relied on to capably train 
Eastern citizens in such areas as accounting, finance, marketing, and overall free-market 
organization. 
Of the case studies analyzed, approximately twethirds held some formal training for 
their management and lower-ranking employees, and ten of the twenty sent some hand- 
picked Eastern employees back to the Western home-country for training. These workers, 
in turn, were relied upon to train their fellow Eastern joint-venture employees back in the 
host-country. In most cases, Western trainers were also brought in for short intervals. 
A few joint ventures, building on their host-country government's desire to upgrade 
its workforce, innovatively used the existing power structure and the centralized economic 
infrastructure in their training efforts. Some examples: 
In Brat islava, the government placed a closed-down textile factory complete 
with its former employees at  the disposal of the Avex joint venture for its 
video-recorder production. As part of the initial joint-venture contract, the 
Western partner Phillips was paid hard currency by the Czech government to 
spend a year re-training many of these workers for the joint-venture's consumer 
technology production. After eight months of activity, 170 of the initial 190 
re-trained employees were successfully working with the joint venture and the 
government had avoided a potentially difficult unemployment problem. 
In Poland, Hanna-Barbera has set up an exclusive contract with the renowned 
Polish Academy of Fine Arts to train artists for its joint venture. The joint- 
venture partners have been able to  design a training program to their 
specifications, with a minimal initial capital investment. 
In Bulgaria, the government has given the Honeywell-Systematics joint venture 
unusual leeway in overall personnel policy because of the perceived benefits of 
the joint-venture's excellent high technology training center there. 
Despite these examples, however, few employees, even at  the managerial level, were 
given any type of overview either of the Western company or of more generally transfer- 
able free market economic operations. With training costs high, and start-up difficult, 
broader training is usually delayed. As AES-PRIS's Govoryutkin explains; "Perestroika 
demands technical and managerial expertise. Unfortunately, the latter must wait." 
Instead, most joint ventures trained their Eastern employees only in skills specific to the 
roles that they were asked to  perform. And due to profit and expediency considerations, 
the most critical freemarket business roles such as export-marketing and quality control 
(which are also the most foreign in the East) are often given to the few Western represen- 
tatives with experience in these areas. 
Partially, the problem also lies in the fact that many Western companies simply do 
not view their East-West joint ventures as similar to their other enterprises. Thus, they 
may not attempt to implement the same type of management systems and control 
mechanisms which in turn limits the training possibilities and experience of the joint 
venture's Eastern employees. When, for example, the Eastern Financial Director of a 
long-standing and profitable joint venture asked for standard home-company turnover 
goals and quotas he was rebuffed. "We are making money for them," he complained, "yet 
we're still treated like stepchildren." 
Further limiting training possibilities are host-country government regulations and 
conditions which make joint venture operation as a truly freemarket company almost 
impossible. Because, for example, all Eastern host-countries demand that joint ventures 
use planned economy accounting systems, Eastern employee opportunities to  learn and 
use Western control systems are limited. Similarly, with hard currency and banking sys- 
tems still tightly held by Eastern governments, training in Western financial management 
methods is almost impossible. And while some joint venture managers can help to create 
an open "Western" feeling in joint ventures, their daily operations for the most part must 
necessarily be a hybrid of Western and Eastern systems in order to handle the internal 
and external tensions of operating in a distinctly non freemarket environment. Until the 
host-countries' overall economic systems move further toward the freemarket, East-West 
joint ventures can not be counted on as a major training ground for Western business 
techniques. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
With the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in transition from the 
still strong influence of their planned economic past to their efforts to become more free 
market oriented, East-West joint ventures are challenged to find the difficult operational 
balance between these stages. Joint ventures must be autonomous enough to  shield them- 
selves from the pervasive external social and political tensions, while a t  the same time 
maintaining good outside relations with the public, government officials and suppliers. 
Inside these joint enterprises, new and more flexible business structures must be esta- 
blished, while still recognizing the limitations presented by incomplete infrastructures and 
few training opportunities. 
To attain such a balance, joint ventures must put stock in what are likely the most 
reliable assets in the East's tumultuous business climate: independent and innovative 
joint-venture employees. While governments fall, laws change, and old attitudes give way 
to new, competent workers, especially a t  the managerial level, can provide a consistent 
anchor for joint-venture operations. Because of this key role, joint venture partners, espe- 
cially those in the West, should be more active in personnel matters. Specifically, they 
must: 1) seek out entrepreneurial Eastern managers who are as loyal to  the joint venture 
as they are to  those in power at  the moment; 2) find employees that understand the 
rewards and benefits of a market economy and believe in the joint partnership and; 3) 
recognize the myriad of pressures on daily operations and the need for flexibility in such 
operations. 
For Western partners, such focus can help to balance power and in some cases even 
allow them to control the joint venture - this despite a lack of majority equity ownership 
and sometimes without any full-time Western employees. In a few joint ventures in 
Poland, Hungary and even in the Soviet Union, operators on both sides involved noted 
that all major decisions were made by the West. This was achieved either because the 
Eastern partners intentionally took a back seat or because operations were controlled by 
managers that tried to model their enterprises after Western businesses or looked to the 
West for overall guidance. While such instances were not the rule, the point remains: 
daily operations can make or break joint ventures, and employees, not ownership percen- 
tages, determine those operations. 
Looking to  the future as most East-West joint ventures move beyond early opera- 
tional phases, internal and external pressures are likely to remain strong. After start-up, 
joint-venture growth often creates added bureaucratic levels and makes personal interac- 
tion and problem solving more difficult. Says Symbol's Michael Levit "With the changing 
situation in the (East), small and medium-sized joint ventures are definitely more flexible 
and much easier to  operate than larger ones. In smaller joint ventures, there aren't as 
many forces vying for influence and when you do have problems you can usually 
straighten them out person to person." Developing joint ventures will also face added 
managerial and personnel pressures as they move from simple cooperation methods like 
service, installation and assembly to  more complicated technology transfer and produc- 
tion methods. "Things are going fine now," said one General Director about a rival joint 
venture, "but they may not be so happy with their workers when they start trying to  pro- 
duce those black boxes from scratch instead of just installing them." 
Finally, while most operators mentioned that the larger a joint venture becomes, the 
more closely it is watched by the government and the public and, thus, the more it is sub- 
ject to  external demands and jealousies, opinion was mixed as to how these external pres- 
sures would develop in the future. Many felt that public and government resistance to 
joint ventures and free-market reforms in general would abate within a few years in 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Few, though, were as sanguine about the 
possibilities in the Soviet Union with many suggesting that the environment there would 
get worse before it gets better. Regardless of the country, however, over the next few 
years change will be an important constant for joint ventures throughout the former 
"East Bloc;" change in host-country citizens' and officials' opinions, change in their 
acceptance-levels, and change in their knowledge of free-market structures. Operators that 
stay aware of the human factor, both inside and outside of their joint enterprises, will 
have a leg up on these future developments. 
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APPENDIX: JOINT VENTURE CASE STUDIES USED FOR THIS REPORT 
1 JOINT COMPANY 1 OUNDEl YEAR 
APV BIONINVEST m 
FANUC MACHINEX 1981 I 
TESSEK 1 
SYSTEMATICS 
BABOLNA MCDONALD 1986 I 
1984 
OTP-PENTA TOURS 1983 
SICONTACT I 1914 
HANNA-BARBERA I lgS7  
ITHK 
AES-PRIS I lgS7 
DIALOG I lgS8 
PERESTROIKA I lgS8 
INTERQUADRO 
P C  WORLD USSR 
PETROVOITH I lgS8 
1987 
1989 
SYMBOL 
MAJOR EASTER) 
PARTNER 
Bioinvest 
SPORTHOTEL 
GUDAURI 
STERCH CONTROLS 
ZMM Production 
Enterprise 
1988 
1988 
Interhotel 
Bulgaria 
Chemical 
Ministry 
Tesla Consumer 
Electronics 
Tesla Labora- 
tory equipment 
Babolna Agrar- 
ian Combine 
Hung. National 
Savings Bank 
Remix Radio 
Technical Corp 
P P  Studio 
Bielsko Biala 
Kosciusko Steel 
Mill 
LOT Polish 
Airlines 
Petrochemical k 
Oil Ministry 
KamAz Factory 
Moscow Aviation 
Institution 
Radio I Sviaa 
Publishing 
Mosinshstroy Eng. 
k Cnstr. E n t r p n .  
Petrozavodsk 
Machine Ent rpne .  
Cooperative 
Georgia Tour- 
ism Ministry 
Fertilizer Prod. 
Ministry 
Fujitsu Fanuc 1 50%-50% 1 E 
(Japan)  9 w  
N.V. Phillips 80%-20% 35OE 
(Netherlands) I l o w  
AS Senatek 51%-49% 120E 
(Denmark) I l o w  
1 (USA) 
(Austria) 
Siemens AG 51%-49% 115E I 1 1W 
Hanna-Barbera 51 %-49% 90E 
Productions 
(USA) I l o w  
Industrie Tech. 51%-49% 36OE 
Walzwerksanlgn. 
(FRG) I l o w  
llbau Constr. (A)  
Combustion Eng. 51 %-49% 45E 
(US*) I I 5 w  
Int'l (USA) 
Delta Trdng ( IT)  
Int'l Da ta  Group 51%-49% POE 
(US*) 1 I 9 w  
Delphi Int'l Grp 80%-90% 8E 
(US*) I I 1 w  
J.N. Voith AG 5156-4936 9E 
(A) I 1 . W  
Story F i n t  Ent- 
ertainment (USA) I I 
Austrian Tourism 
Consultants (A) 
Honeywell Corp. I 51%-49% 1 48: 
(USA) 
TYPE OR BRANCH 
OF ACTIVITY 
Consulting and engineering 
in biotechnology and food service1 
Service and Maintenance of CNC 
s y s t e m  for machine tool industry 
Hotel operation via management 
contract 
Design, engineering and marketinl 
of automated control systems 
Production of videorecorden 
and  cameras 
Production and marketing of 
liquid chromotography equipmen1 
Restaurant Operation 
T o u n  and Travel Agency 
Computer sales, service and 
software development 
Animation and film production 
Processing of metallurgical 
wastes 
Build and operate airline term- 
inal, hotel and office space 
Service and manufacture of CNC 
systems for petrochemical in dust^ 
Service and assembly of penonal  
romputen  and  information system 
Service and assembly of penonal  
:omputen and information system 
Computer magazine production 
and  publishing 
Office and apartment  building 
construction and renovation 
Develop and manufacture mach- 
inery for paper and pulp industry 
Clothing design and production 
USSR and Western markets 
Operation and marketing 
of ski resort 
Service and manufacture of CNC 
s y s t e m  for fertilizer industry 
Sources: Interviews and Emat-Wert Joint Venturea , the  Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations. New 
York. 1988. All information is a s  of the  date  of interviews. 
* not a joint venture 
** in formation 
